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Abstract
While many commentators have been openly critical of China's currency policy on the basis
of an undervalued renminbi, despite a similar surge in GCC's (Gulf Cooperation Council)
balance of payment surpluses in the rst decade of this century, the vast majority of the
commentators have maintained a stony silence on the undervalued Gulf currencies. This
underscores the geopolitics of currencies as a form of asymmetric warfare and the conse-
quences of dollar, euro or renminbi diplomacy. This paper makes two main additions to the
literature on Gulf monetary union. First, it emphasizes that the creation of a scal union
is necessary for the Gulf monetary union to succeed. Second, it proposes some alternatives
to pegging to the dollar, which would allow the GCC to absorb large swings in global com-
modity prices (oil, food) in the short to medium run. The proposed exchange rate regimes
are not conditional on the formation of the Gulf monetary union, and can be implemented
individually or collectively.
Keywords: Fixed exchange rate; Currency basket; Fiscal union; Monetary union; Gulf
Cooperation Council.
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\The dollar is our currency, but your problem."
John Connally, 1971.1
1 Introduction
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries2 are already in a monetary union with the
United States (US) dollar. The widespread and intense discussion about the planned GCC
currency union is about replacing the US dollar with the (new) GCC currency, commonly
known as the Khaleeji dinar. The benets of a currency union are well-known, as are its costs.
The major cost of joining a monetary union is the loss of sovereign monetary policy. However,
such cost is not a new phenomenon for the GCC (as the current monetary union with the US
shows), while the potential benets of a GCC-specic monetary union are presumed to greatly
outweigh its costs. Some key benets are worth reiterating here. These include transaction cost
savings, greater price transparency, increased import purchasing power and, above all, a much
needed new economic paradigm for the GCC to support the economic growth and development
of the member countries in the 21st century.
Over the past decades, a large number of academic and non-academic papers have been
written covering the economic, political and social aspects of the planned GCC monetary union.
This is no occasion to oer a critical review of the existing contributions. Interested readers
are advised to consult, among others, Buiter (2007), Alkholifey and Alreshan (2010), Alkhater
(2012) and the references therein. A somewhat common conclusion that arises from the majority
of the contributions is that although the GCC monetary union makes good economic sense, the
project faces signicant headwinds in terms of low intra-regional trade, a lack of supranational
political institutions and enormous gaps in research capacity.
This paper contributes to the literature on the Gulf monetary union in two ways. First, in
light of the structural problems in the European Monetary Union (EMU), this paper emphasizes
the need for the proper scal arrangements within the GCC union. In the case where market
mechanisms for risk insurance are not sucient, a monetary union requires a system of interre-
gional and intertemporal transfers which can alleviate the consequences of negative shocks such
as those that occurred in the nancial crisis of 2007{2009 (see Bordo et al., 2011). Unless the
1President Nixon's Treasury Secretary.
2The GCC includes Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). All
currencies but the Kuwaiti dinar maintain a de facto peg to the US dollar. It is widely believed that the US
dollar has a high share in the Kuwaiti currency basket.
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Gulf monetary union is complemented by the GCC scal union, the political commitment to
facilitating the monetary union would be marred by low credibility.
Second, despite their massive balance of payment surpluses and the associated eects on
domestic demand, the GCC's propensity to peg to the US dollar has not changed. The unrea-
sonableness and the unsustainability of this mix of a large surplus and a peg should be clear to
the GCC's policy makers. A exible exchange rate regime will permit the GCC to absorb large
swings in commodity (oil, food) prices and allow them to devise their own monetary policy to
address domestic conditions. This paper proposes an alternative to pegging to the dollar for
the GCC countries to consider until the GCC central bank can be fully independent from the
Federal Reserve.
The plan of this paper is as follows: Section 2 provides a summary assessment of the current
state of economic integration among the GCC countries. Section 3 provides a description of the
proposed GCC scal union, while Section 4 oers a menu of choices of exible exchange rate
regimes for the GCC. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 The Current State of Economic Integration among GCC Coun-
tries
Since a thorough assessment of the economic integration is beyond the scope of this paper,3 we
limit our attention here to trade and nancial ows among the six GCC countries. Figures 1 and
2 plot the intra-GCC import and export ows over the 1975{2010 period. Several remarks are
in order. First, the magnitude of intra-GCC exports is lower than that of intra-GCC imports
because of the high share of oil in several countries' total exports. As of 2010, the average
share of oil in the combined GCC exports is nearly 75%, with Kuwait (the UAE) being the
most (least) dependent on oil exports (90% versus 35%). Second, although some members have
important bilateral import trade with other GCC countries, for the two largest economies in
the region (i.e., Saudi Arabia and the UAE), the share remains at a stubbornly low level. The
comparatively high ratios observed for Bahrain, Oman and Qatar reect, in part, the nature of
their factor endowment, being limited domestic production base. On the other hand, despite
having a narrow domestic production base, Kuwait relies on imported consumer and capital
goods from countries outside the GCC region. Overall, total trade ows among GCC countries
3Interested readers are referred to World Bank (2010).
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rose from US$8 billion in 1980, which represented 3.85% of their total trade ows with the rest
of the world, to US$62 billion in 2010, a share of 6.50% of their total trade with the rest of
the world. This suggests that despite showing some tendency for trade creation, the intra-GCC
trade is experiencing slow progress in trade integration.4 Similarities in resource endowments
and production structures and limited product dierentiation are among the possible factors
that can explain the low degree of intra-regional trade.
Compared to commodity trade, nancial integration among GCC countries has been moving
at a faster pace (see World Bank, 2010), but the real benets from increased nancial integration
are dicult to evaluate. While intra-GCC FDI (foreign direct investment) ows and M&A
(mergers and acquisitions) activities have ourished in recent years,5 hitherto the GCC has
been unable to leverage their collective resources (e.g., sovereign wealth funds) on investment in
regional industry. Policy makers in the GCC often miss the point that intra-regional investment
is a major force to help the region to move forward as a force of change. Trade is a secondary
issue to this wider system. The GCC faces a number of challenges to achieving a strong nancial
integration in the region. One such factor is the increasing standards of corporate governance,
which portend a signicant challenge to the traditional business mindset of the Gulf companies.
As a result, the capacity for cross-listing among various Gulf bourses remains very limited.
Second, a glaring problem in the region is that none of the countries considers the abuse of
`insider information' as a criminal oence. The volatility and turbulence often observed in the
regional stock markets are largely a result of relatively \weak corporate governance and the lack
of good transparency and accountability and disclosure standards" (Saidi, 2011).
Summing up, without a strong home-based economy, nancial wealth alone can be very
ineective in mitigating risks. The long-term economic and political risk of the GCC's total
trade dependence on the outside world cannot be overemphasized. Most Gulf countries are
aware of this risk and recognize the need to diversify their local economies. A visionary plan
based on greater regionalization can serve as a building block to a more healthy economic union.
3 Lessons for the GCC from Europe: A GCC Fiscal Union
One of the clearest lessons of the European debt crisis is that a monetary union without a scal
union is problematic. A common monetary policy may sometimes fail to stabilize asymmetric
4See Nechi (2010) for additional discussion.
5See Booz & Company (2011) and Espinoza et al. (2011) for numerical and statistical gures.
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shocks across members, which makes the case for insurance arrangements among members to
provide transfers to countries in more dire circumstances. A scal union thus works as an auto-
matic stabilizer across regions, providing adequate buers against asymmetric macroeconomic
shocks in a currency union.
Within the GCC, the UAE oers a close resemblance to the EMU's structure. The UAE is
a confederation of emirates, where the monetary and exchange rate policies are managed on a
federal basis by the Central Bank of the UAE. However, similar to the EMU, each emirate man-
ages its own scal policy independently with no explicit obligation to contribute to the budget
of another emirate (see Cevik, 2011).6 The limitations in the design of UAE's scal federalism,
as in the EMU, were exposed when Dubai World, a holding company of the Government of
Dubai, was unable to repay its debt in mid-2008, prompting the Government of Abu Dhabi
to extend nancial support to restructure the debt of Dubai World and its subsidiaries. This
incident highlights the vulnerability associated with the high degree of scal decentralization at
the sub-national level and the need for closer coordination in scal policy.
The rst step in designing proper scal policy arrangements with the GCC is to identify
the goals of the supranational federal scal authority, as there is no single denition of scal
federalism. If the goal is to compensate a member state for a decline in its income not only
when this decline is temporary (scal stabilization) but also when it is permanent (scal redis-
tribution), then the scal{federal structure of the US and Canada can be used as a template
for the GCC. In the absence of personal income taxation in the GCC, these programs can be
nanced through revenue-sharing arrangements so that the \have not" member states end up
securing more (oil) money.7
Alternatively, the supranational scal authority can coordinate among member states in set-
ting a medium-term common scal stance, subject to periodic revisions, as a means to synchro-
nize government spending within the monetary union. This involves outlining a medium-term
common scal budget, where the members are committed to remain within the strict purview
of the agreed upon expenditure levels and are willing to oset any shortfalls that may occur
due to changes in market conditions. Further, although a scal union generally provides an ex
post solution to crises within a monetary union, it is wise to take an ex ante approach to scal
federalism in the form of identifying possible sources of troubles (e.g., overspending) for the
6Both Abu Dhabi and Dubai, the largest and wealthiest emirates, contribute to federal budget in agreed
amounts, but the federal responsibilities are managed by Abu Dhabi (Cevik, 2011).
7See Buiter (2007) for further discussion of the issue of scal federalism in the context of the GCC.
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stability of the unied monetary union.
In either case, strong coordination with the unied monetary authority is a prerequisite.
Union-wide expansionary scal spending, for example, can only be implemented if the common
central bank is well equipped with medium- to long-term debt instruments to sterilize excess
liquidity from the banking system.
A major obstacle to GCC scal union is the loss of discretionary scal spending power, espe-
cially those targeting social categories. For instance, following the political transformations in
the countries aected by the Arab Spring, the GCC governments launched politically motivated
scal measures in 2011 in a bid to avoid public protests (see Table 1). In a scal union, the
freedom of implementing such politically motivated scal measures will be seriously curtailed,
since any discriminatory politically motivated scal action in one country will create similar
pressure in other member states, due to the very unique economic and political structure of
the GCC. Given the nontrivial size of these expenses as a share of GDP, the GCC governments
thus face a dilemma about whether or not to give up (or curtail) the autonomy of such political
instruments in favor of a federal scal union to support the broader economic union.
Table 1: Summary of recent scal measures in GCC countries.
Time Country Package Contents
February 13, 2011 Bahrain Cash transfers of US$2,660 to each family.
January 17, 2011 Kuwait
Cash transfers of US$3,600 to each Kuwaiti citizen
and free essential food items for 18 months beginning
in February 2011. An estimated spending of about
3.25% of annual GDP.
February 27, 2011 Oman
Employment for 50,000 Omanis and establishment of
a monthly unemployment benet of US$390.
September 1, 2011 Qatar
Substantial increases in public sector salaries and pen-
sions beginning in September 2011, estimated at more
than 3% of GDP.
March 18, 2011 Saudi Arabia
Plan to construct 500,000 housing units, and build and
expand hospitals; a two-month salary bonus to state
employees and a 19% increase in the minimum public
sector wage.
February 1, 2011 UAE
Infrastructure stimulus program focusing on the
northern emirates, a 70% increase in pensions for mil-
itary personnel, and state subsidies for rice and bread.
Source: IMF (2011) and Al Masah Capital (2012).
A specic characteristic of GCC diplomacy is that these countries tend to settle disputes
and disagreements between them through informal means, rather than resorting to institution-
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based treatments. It is thus possible to have a shadow scal union without any institutional
constraint. The creation of a US$20 billion `Gulf development fund' in 2011 to provide nancial
assistance to Bahrain and Oman provides good validation of the GCC's general diplomatic
principles. The fund was set up by the four wealthiest members of GCC after Bahrain and
Oman were hit by public protests in early 2011. This fund will provide US$1 billion annually
over the next 10 years to both countries to address the socio-economic issues they face.
We conclude this section with a few remarks on the role of the common central bank as
a lender of last resort (LOLR). Some commentators (De Grauwe, 2011; Wyplosz 2011) have
pointed out that a key design aw in the Eurozone was the absence of a LOLR (i.e., the European
Central Bank, ECB) in government bond markets. As a result, the Eurozone has set up the
European Financial Stability Facility for this purpose. Under immense political pressure, the
ECB has lately announced that it will make itself the LOLR in government bond markets under
the new program, dubbed Outright Monetary Transactions.
Should the GCC learn such a lesson from the EMU? Experience shows that such a system
tends to be more crisis-prone (see Johnson and Boone, 2012). This is where the signicance
of ex ante scal arrangements within a monetary union apply. If the habit of irresponsible
spending beyond one's means is curtailed at the outset, the issue of the LOLR becomes less
signicant. Further, given the large accumulation of foreign exchange reserves in the form of
sovereign wealth funds, the GCC countries are well equipped to face a truly systematic nancial
crisis. Nonetheless, an `anti-crisis fund' can be created to partially mitigate the economic and
social costs of an unforeseen crisis.
4 GCC Currency Union: Evaluating Exchange Rate Regimes
The single factor that characterizes GCC's aair with the US dollar is oil. As oil is priced,
invoiced and paid in US dollars, the GCC governments found it natural to peg their currencies
to the dollar. The dollar peg worked relatively well in the 1980s and 1990s, primarily because
the oil price tended to revert to the mean; however, as the composition of global growth has
fundamentally shifted from the OECD countries to large emerging economies8 during the past
decade, resulting a disconnection between (i) oil prices and the federal funds rate (FFR) and
(ii) oil prices and the value of the US dollar (see Figures 3a,b). As these graphs show, oil price
8For example, Brazil, Russia, India and China, the so-called BRIC countries.
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tended to mean-revert over 1973{2000, while since the beginning of 2001, they have shown a
highly positive trend. The fact that both `oil prices and the FFR' and `oil prices and the US
dollar' have moved in opposing directions in the past decade has important implications for the
currencies of the GCC countries.
First, the fact that the Federal Reserve did not increase its targeted FFR during most of
the last decade when oil prices were rising strongly, suggests that the Federal Reserve was
more concerned with the deteriorating domestic economic conditions rather than the potential
inationary spillover of rising oil prices into the US economy. By comparison, facing a completely
dierent economic situation, the GCC countries wrongly imported the easy monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve at a time when their domestic economies were booming on the back of
soaring oil export revenues. The fact that oil prices and the FFR have diverged in the last
decade is a powerful validation of the economic de-coupling of the US and GCC economies,
however temporary. As Figure 4 shows, although they continue to be volatile as before, the
nominal GDP growth in each of the GCC countries was much higher than that of the US.
Likewise, despite their high ination rates during 2000s, the GCC's real GDP growth rates
were well above the US level (see Figure 5). Conceptually, a country should raise (but not
lower) its interest rates when the domestic economy is booming to prevent a possible hard
landing.
Second, we also see that, unlike in the 1980s and 1990s when both the US dollar and oil
prices maintained a somewhat positive relationship, since the start of the last decade, that rela-
tionship has clearly diverged. In fact, for the rst time in history, the US dollar has persistently
depreciated at a time when oil prices persistently increased. The GCC currencies were hit hard
by the depreciating dollar. Since the GCC's nominal exchange rates could not adjust, all the
adjustment of the weakening dollar was reected in their real exchange rates in the form of
higher domestic price levels. As shown in Figure 6, save for Bahrain, compared to the US,
ination rates were much higher in the remaining GCC countries. Higher domestic ination
rates helped real interest rates to dip into negative territory. Negative real interest rates, in
turn, contributed to both asset and goods price ination, posing a long-term risk to nancial
stability and misallocation of capital.9
9Further, the GCC's large current account surpluses (see Figure 7) translated into rapid monetary growth,
while the signicant scal intake from oil-related activities has fueled infrastructural and other spending. These,
along with the weak dollar and world food price ination, were the main drivers of ination in the GCC countries
{ see Basher and Elsamadisy (2012) for further discussion.
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Although the decoupling of the US dollar and the FFR from the oil price makes a strong
case for the GCC to ditch the dollar peg that has lasted for over 30 years, a more fundamental
argument against the dollar peg comes from the evidence of the structural economic shifts that
the GCC economies have experienced in the rst decade of the 21st century. The GCC now has a
vibrant non-hydrocarbon sector, a relatively sophisticated nancial sector and a healthy balance
of payment surplus. Further, both the GCC's imports and exports are increasingly exposed to
demand from emerging Asian countries (especially China), while its monetary policy is still
guided by the Federal Reserve. The unreasonableness and the unsustainability of this mix of
structural economic shifts in the GCC economies and the imported interest rate policy should
be clear to the GCC policy makers. To put this into perspective, imagine the predicament
China would be in had it maintained its de facto peg to the dollar.
It is clear from the discussion above that the GCC countries must soon adopt a more exible
exchange rate regime (and hence a more independent monetary policy) to deal with large swings
in global commodity prices. In the remainder of this section, we consider several alternative
exchange rate choices, keeping in mind the structural characteristics of the GCC economies.
Some variations of the proposed exchange rate regimes have already been discussed in Sester
(2007), Jen (2008) and Khan (2009). It must be emphasized that the proposed currency regimes
are not conditional on the formation of the GCC monetary union, and can be implemented both
at the individual and/or regional level.
4.1 The BBC Regime
\BBC" stands for basket, band and crawl, and was popularized by Williamson (2000). The
basket part of the BBC proposal involves pegging a country's currency to a set of its trading
partners' currencies. The currencies (and their associated weights) in the basket are generally
determined based on a country's commodity trade with its trading partners; subject to data
availability, service trade and nancial ows can also be considered when selecting the optimal
number of currencies. For the GCC, a relevant issue is which weights to use: exports, imports
or both. Until today, GCC's exports { dominated by oil and gas { have not faced competi-
tive pressure in the international market mainly due to a lack of alternatives to hydrocarbon
products.10 Further, the share of non-oil exports in the GCC's total exports is still small and
10However, the coming boom in global natural gas production will increasingly challenge the hegemony of oil,
and may replace oil as a transport fuel and as a feedstock in petrochemicals in a few decades.
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non-oil exports tend to comprise oil-related products such as petrochemicals. Based on these
facts, it is not viable to include exports in the calculation of the weights because preserving the
price competitiveness of merchandise exports is yet to be a policy target for the GCC due to
its unique pattern of trade. This leaves import weights as the principal basis of the construc-
tion of a currency basket. Indeed, for the GCC the pressing goal is to preserve the purchasing
power of imports due to its heavy dependence on importing a large spectrum of commodities
(including agricultural, food, industrial and capital goods). Further, given the specic structure
of the GCC's domestic production base, imports are widely considered as one of the factors of
production.
One of the main challenges that GCC countries face is the volatility of their income, due
to large uctuations in oil prices. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, the GCC's nominal and real
GDP growth is far more volatile than that of the US. High income volatility exerts a negative
eect on consumption and investment, and is the leading cause of the pro-cyclicality of budget
decits in GCC countries.11 The currency basket based on import weights proposed above is not
equipped to deal with income volatility stemming from large swings in oil prices. One way to
dampen income volatility is to include the price of oil alongside the trading partners' currencies
in the conventional basket. This is well-known `peg to export price' (PEP) system proposed by
Frankel (2005). By including oil price in the currency basket, the value of the domestic currency
is allowed to move in tandem with the uctuations in oil prices. Thus, when the dollar price of
exports rises (falls), the domestic currency appreciates (depreciates) in terms of dollars. Such
accommodation of the terms of trade shocks is precisely what is needed to dampen the income
volatility of GCC countries. Therefore, the recommended rst step for GCC countries is to
devise a broad currency basket that also includes the price of oil.
The second element of the BBC system is a band as a target around the central parity (inter-
preted as up to 5%, 10% or even 15%). Given the diculty of estimating the equilibrium
exchange rate, the primary rationale for bands is to provide the exibility to prevent volatility
in the nancial markets from adversely aecting the real economy, as seen, for example, in
the strong but temporary capital inows in Qatar and the UAE prior to the intensication
of the nancial crisis in mid-2008.12 A natural response in such a situation is to widen the
11Over the 1970{2002 period, the average pro-cyclicality of decits in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and the UAE
was estimated at 12% compared to a counter-cyclicality of about 16% in the OECD countries. See Shamloo
(2005) for additional discussion.
12See Elsamadisy et al. (2013) for an analysis of the consequences of speculative capital inows on the domestic
banking sector in Qatar.
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policy bands as volatility increases in foreign exchange markets and subsequently narrow them
when some degree of calm returns to the market. During the Asian nancial crisis, the policy
band helped the Monetary Authority of Singapore to mitigate the short-term volatility of the
Singapore dollar against major currencies.13
The nal element of the BBC regime is the crawl. The crawling band exchange rate regime is
implemented through continuous adjustment of the trade-weighted nominal eective exchange
rate of the domestic currency, usually at a rate of crawl based on the dierential between the
domestic ination target and the forecasted ination of the trading partner countries. For the
fast-growing GCC countries, a crawling band oers additional exibility for ghting ination.
A basket-based system of exchange rate determination, although more complicated than
the xed peg, is not a stranger to GCC countries. Kuwait has been living with a currency
basket since 1975, except between January 2003 and May 2007, when the Kuwaiti dinar was
pegged to the US dollar. The solid track record of the Monetary Authority of Singapore, the
country's central bank, in managing its exchange rate system under the BBC principles tells us
that even for small open economies in the GCC, such as Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar,
an independent monetary regime with a exible exchange rate system is not only feasible but
also desirable for their quest for national economic transformation.
4.2 The Floating Regime
A pure oat oers the possibility of transforming the new GCC currency into a major inter-
national currency in the long run. One way to achieve this is by pricing the GCC's exports
(largely oil and natural gas) in its own currency. Pricing exports in the local currency will im-
mediately create a sizable international market for the new GCC currency. Given the imperfect
substitutes for oil and natural gas in the world market, there will be a natural demand for the
new GCC currency. However, the main impediment on the implementation of a free oat is
the lack of economic diversication within the GCC. Unless the GCC's economy becomes as
diversied as that of Australia, Canada or Norway, a pure oat will likely experience greater
exchange rate volatility than a managed oat based on the BBC principles.
In fact, before adopting a fully-edged BBC system, GCC countries could contemplate
widening exchange rate band around the existing xed parity as a means to gain more exibility
to their currencies. For instance, if Qatar considers a 5% band around the existing parity (i.e.,
13See Robinson (2001).
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US$1=QR3.64), it would allow the monetary authority to steer its currency in a direction that
is supportive to its monetary policy goal(s). Of course, identifying the actual width of the
band would require detailed analysis to eliminate the need to speculate, and the upshot of this
argument is that a move from the current status quo arrangement to a more exible exchange
rate system would demand minimal institutional arrangements.
Summing up, the GCC monetary union based on the BBC currency system raises many
positive possibilities. An independent currency will allow GCC economies to eectively manage
external shocks, and it will also contribute positively to the regional economy. For example,
Yemen may nd it attractive to peg its currency to the new GCC currency, or Iraq may wish to
join the GCC monetary union as a new member. A well-designed GCC monetary union could
trigger a much needed macroeconomic transformation throughout the Middle East and North
Africa region, and may pave the way to eventually turn into a Pan-Arab monetary union.
5 Concluding Remarks
As implied in the famous remark by John Connally, the GCC has to solve its own problem and
the time to act is now. The decoupling of `oil prices and federal funds rate' and `oil prices and the
dollar' in the past decade makes a strong case against the sustainability of the dollar peg for the
GCC countries. Further, the recent implementation of the third round of \quantitative easing"
or QE3 (widely dubbed as `QE Innity') by the Federal Reserve implies that the federal funds
rate is kept at the near zero level until mid-2015, while the US dollar is likely to continue to fall
as a result of the Federal Reserve's latest round of printing money. Given the relatively bright
economic outlook for the GCC region, the cost of continuing to import an ultra-easy monetary
policy (and the resulting weakness in the US dollar) will be heavy for the GCC economy. The
GCC has to realize the shift in the world's oil demand from industrial to emerging markets that
took place over the last decade, and translate this into action by making the required reforms
in its exchange rate policy. The GCC has much to gain from greater exchange rate exibility,
and the world economy would also benet from an eective global adjustment.
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Figure 1: Inter-GCC imports (% of total imports in the respective countries). Source: Direction
of Trade Statistics, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations. BAH,
Bahrain; KUW, Kuwait; OMN, Oman; QAT, Qatar. KSA, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia; UAE,
United Arab Emirates.
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(a) The US’s interest rate versus oil prices
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Figure 3: Oil price, federal funds rate and US dollar nominal eective exchange rate (EER).
Source: Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and
the author's own calculations.
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Figure 4: Nominal GDP growth in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic
Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 5: Real GDP growth in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic
Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 6: Ination rates in the US and GCC countries (%). Source: World Economic Outlook
database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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Figure 7: Current account balance in the US and GCC countries (% of GDP). Source: World
Economic Outlook database, International Monetary Fund and the author's own calculations.
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